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Chambers v. District of Columbia and the Future of Title VII
Andrew Melzer, Alok Nadig, and Lindsay Marum*
If an employee suffers from workplace discrimination—even blatant
animus—that meaningfully affects the person’s job or workplace
experience, are there some discriminatory acts or practices that are
considered too inconsequential or to cause too little harm to be touched by
anti-discrimination laws, namely Title VII? This is the essential question
presented by Chambers v. District of Columbia, which considers whether an
employee denied a requested transfer for discriminatory reasons may
pursue a Title VII claim.
Title VII is one of the nation’s foundational civil rights statutes. In relevant
part, it provides: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Title VII’s prohibitions and protections are broad and sweeping. The
statute is intended to eradicate and root out all forms and vestiges of
employment discrimination and provide for complete equality of
opportunity, while compensating victims and making them whole for
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their injuries.1 Congress’ policy of outlawing of discrimination is of the
“highest priority.”2
Under these principles, job “benefits that comprise the ‘incidents of
employment,’ or that form ‘an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and employees,’ may not be afforded in a manner contrary to
Title VII.”3 Courts’ interpretations and applications of the statute “must be
consistent with the important purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be
an environment free of discrimination, where race [gender, etc.] is not a
barrier to opportunity.”4
And, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in the sexual harassment
context: “the language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
* Attorneys at Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (“Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity
due to discrimination on the on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin and
ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the highest
priority.”) (collecting cases); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (Title
VII’s “central statutory purposes” are “eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.”);
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995) (Title VII’s purpose
is the “elimination of discrimination in the workplace”; the statute is designed to spur
employers “to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of discrimination”
and also provides for “deterrence” as well as “compensation for injuries caused by the
prohibited discrimination”).
1

See also, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (Congress sought “to
assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices
that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Cal. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (“The purpose of Title VII is to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees.”); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1998).
2

Franks, 424 U.S. at 763.

3

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75–76 (1984).

4

Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (emphasis added).
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discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”5 This is not
limited to actual job-related actions (transfers, discipline, etc.), but even to
verbal abuse or sexual advances or comments that, if sufficiently severe or
pervasive, may undermine workers’ psychological well-being and
interfere with their job performance.6
Despite these overarching precepts, some courts have held that certain
types of discriminatory acts and conduct do not qualify as materially
adverse employment actions—and thus come outside of the scope of Title
VII’s prohibition of unlawful employment practices, including
discriminatory terms or conditions. Such practices include, for example,
involuntary lateral transfers or denials of transfer unaccompanied by a
change in pay or benefits or a significant change in responsibilities;7 denial
of job training;8 negative performance reviews; and written and verbal
warnings, reprimands, and other forms of discipline.9 Under such case
5

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (emphasis added).

See id. at 64–67. At the same time, the Court has indicated that Title VII should not be
converted into a “general civility code” that pervasively controls how employees interact
with each other—“ordinary socializing in the workplace” when discrimination on the basis
of protected characteristics (race, gender, etc.) is not implicated. Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
6

See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 455–57 (D.C. Cir. 1999); U.S. EEOC v. AutoZone,
Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2017); Swain v. City of Vineland, 457 F. App’x 107, 110 (3d
Cir. 2012).
7

See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2004); Hollimon v.
Potter, 365 F. App’x 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Hollimon alleges that Caucasian employees
were given training that he was denied because of his race and were also allowed to take
unscheduled leave. As the district court found, a refusal to train is not an adverse
employment action under Title VII.”); but see Torre v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F. Supp.
3d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
8

See, e.g., King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App’x 77, 84–85 (5th Cir. 2008) (“poor performance
evaluations, unjust criticism, and being placed on probation”); Whitaker v. N. Ill. Univ.,
424 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 2005) (disciplinary measures—negative evaluation, written
9
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law, employers are free to run members of protected groups through a
gauntlet of degradation and humiliation in the workplace as long as they
do not cross a certain threshold of tangible harm.10
In this article, we examine the Chambers case and the arguments made by
the parties and their amici. We contend that declaring certain categories of
overtly discriminatory workplace acts, such as so-called “harmless”
transfers or denials of transfer, off-limits to Title VII rests on an
impermissibly narrow reading of the statute that is inconsistent with its
language, structure, and purpose; the statute is focused on employer
intent and equality of treatment and opportunity. Further, this type of
blanket rule is incompatible with the established concept of nominal
damages for statutory and constitutional civil rights violations,11 as well as
Title VII’s robust provisions for equitable and injunctive relief (see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). Questions about the degree of harm suffered by an
warnings, and selective requirement of proof of illnesses—that did not result in “tangible
job consequences”); Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003)
(must be a “significant change in employment status”).
Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), is broader in scope and often
provides for expanded grounds for relief. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006). But, even there, some courts have taken a grudging view. See, e.g., King, 294
F. App’x at 85 (verbal reprimands, improper work requests, unfair treatment, abusive
remarks, and threats of termination).
For example, employers might constantly berate such workers, subject them to excessive
scrutiny, single them out for special protocols and screenings (see, e.g., Reddy v. Salvation
Army, 591 F. Supp. 2d 406, 426–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Davis v. NYS Dep’t of Corrs., 46 F.
Supp. 3d 226, 235–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)), make them go through sham investigations based
on false accusations (see, e.g., Davis, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 236 (false accusations); Ross v. Bd. of
Regents, 655 F. Supp.2d 895, 910–11 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (audit conducted in disruptive and
unfair manner not actionable except that it resulted in plaintiff’s demotion)), or relegate
them to the graveyard shift or the back of the company bus or parking lot (see Leach v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 128 F. Supp. 3d 146, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2015)). Yet, designated
heightened security processes for Blacks or unfavorable hours or parking spots for women
would seem to violate the core proscription against job segregation. Employers should not
be able to do the same thing on a de facto basis.
10

11

See, e.g., Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021).
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employee are best dealt with as damages issues rather than a complete bar
to relief.12
This is especially the case with regard to job transfers. Even if there is no
“tangible” effect on employees’ compensation, rank, or job
responsibilities, a discriminatory transfer or denial of transfer can have a
significant impact on their work experiences and opportunities.
Employees seek transfers to be in a particular geographic location or
working environment, have preferrable working hours or conditions,
work under a particular supervisor or away from an abusive one, or to set
up a potential path for advancement in their careers. They should not
have to prove an immediate tangible benefit or disadvantage. Doling out
plum assignments and opportunities on the basis of a protected
characteristic such as race or gender goes to the heart of Title VII’s
protections against employment discrimination. It affects employees’
dignity and quality of life in meaningful ways that restrict or limit their
ability to participate in the economy on an equal playing field. The real
question on liability is not whether or how the harm can be measured but
whether the employer’s acts are actually motivated by discriminatory
animus.13

Cf. Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of City of N.Y., 867 F.3d 298, 306 (2d Cir. 2017)
(where an employee has a claim for being subjected to a notice of prospective termination,
recission of the notice does not negate liability—even where the employee has never
actually been out of a job—but bears “consequences [that] come into play in connection
with the calculation of damages.”).
12

Hence, the D.C. Circuit in Chambers need not consider Title VII’s application to truly
trivial matters, which are not at issue on the appeal. Cf. Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
61 A.D. 62, 80 (N.Y. App. 2009) (under the New York City Human Rights Law, when
departing from the federal “severe or pervasive” standard for hostile work environment
harassment claims (in favor of a more lenient “treated less well” test), recognizing an
affirmative defense for “truly insubstantial cases” in which the employer can prove “that
the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of
discrimination would consider ‘petty slights and trivial inconveniences.’”); see also
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68–69.
13
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Rundown of the Chambers Case
Mary Chambers worked for the District of Columbia’s Office of the
Attorney General (OAG). In 2000, she became a Support Enforcement
Specialist within OAG’s Child Support Division. Chambers initially
worked in the Child Support Division’s Interstate Unit. In 2008, Chambers
requested a transfer to the Intake Unit, which was denied.14
Following the denial, Chambers began noticing various ways in which the
District treated her worse than her male peers. For example, the District
suspended her based on a minor, disputed encounter instigated by a
visitor even though she had no prior disciplinary record.15 Meanwhile, a
male enforcement specialist who was consistently disrespectful to agency
visitors avoided significant discipline. Similarly, another male employee
who used a government vehicle for an improper purpose was also never
disciplined. This differential treatment led Chambers to believe that her
transfer request had been denied for discriminatory reasons.
In August 2010, Chambers filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
based on the District’s denial of her request for a transfer. A month later,
she sent an e-mail to her supervisors, asking them to reconsider her
request. They denied it again the next day.16

14

See Chambers v. District of Columbia, 988 F.3d 497, 499–500 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

On April 6, 2010, Chambers leaned on a trash can while off duty and waiting for an
elevator when a client “came out of the office in a rage, walked behind her, dumped his
food and his drink in the trash can, and then said, ‘Move your fat ass off the trash can.’”
Chambers and the client dispute what happened next, but Chambers maintains that when
she pointed the client to another trash can, he told her, “If you say another [expletive]
thing, I’m going to punch you in your face.’” Chambers was ultimately reported and
suspended for having “an inappropriate verbal exchange” with the client. Her union then
successfully challenged the suspension and had the discipline removed from her file.
15

16

Id.
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In October 2010, as the Child Support Enforcement Division was
restructuring, Chambers again requested a transfer to the Intake Unit.
Under the restructuring, the Interstate Unit would be eliminated, and
Chambers’ position would be moved to the Enforcement Unit. However,
the actual work and tasks that Chambers had previously performed in the
Interstate Unit were to be transferred to the Intake Unit—where she
wished to be reassigned. Nevertheless, the District still denied Chambers’
transfer request, maintaining implausibly, and without further
explanation, that reassigning her did “not fit into management’s
immediate plans” for the Interstate Unit.17
At this point, Chambers had ample reason to suspect that the District’s
continued denial of her transfer requests was a result of gender
discrimination and retaliation for her prior discrimination complaints—
including her EEOC charge. Similarly situated male colleagues, including
those with “significant personnel issues” (i.e., disciplinary or performance
concerns), had routinely received requested transfers. In fact, the District
agreed to move of one of Chambers’ male colleagues simply because he
preferred to avoid a noisy co-worker.
In March 2011, after the District again denied Chambers’ renewed transfer
request, she filed another charge of discrimination with the EEOC,
alleging that the transfer denial constituted sex discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII.
Chambers tried her luck again six months later. At that time, she and a
colleague assigned to the Intake Unit asked to switch positions. In
proposing the switch, Chambers explained that it was likely that the
Intake Unit would be handling more “establishment cases” and “interstate
work,” areas within her expertise. Chambers explained that she had also
personally trained the individuals working in the Intake Unit.
Additionally, Chambers spoke with the Intake Unit’s manager, who said

17

Id.
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that she “would be welcomed” to the unit. Yet, the District again denied
Chambers’ transfer request. This indicated that she was permanently
blacklisted, likely because of her gender and repeated complaints of
discrimination.
Having exhausted all other avenues, Chambers finally went to court in
2014, suing the District for gender discrimination and retaliation.
Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment
against Chambers.18 The court found that her claims were not actionable
under circuit law because she “failed to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exist[ed] as to whether she suffered an adverse action.”19 On
appeal, a panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that “for cases
involving purely lateral transfers, a plaintiff does not suffer an actionable
injury unless there are some other materially adverse consequences
affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment or her
future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm.”20 The
D.C. Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and a final decision from the
full court is pending. Oral argument before the full Circuit Court was held
on October 26, 2021.
As an initial matter, we note that Chambers did appear to experience
palpable harm as a result of the repeated denials of her transfer request.
Clearly, a transfer was of critical importance to Chambers and her sense of
well-being in the workplace—otherwise, she would not have requested it
at least four times from 2008 to 2011. Indeed, she maintained that she
needed a transfer because her working conditions were “unbearable”—
including a disproportionate and excessive workload that eventually
forced her to take extended medical leave—and that a transfer would
have also provided greater advancement opportunities. Yet, the District
18

Chambers v. Dist. of Columbia, 389 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2019).

19

Id. at 93.

20

988 F.3d at 501 (citing and applying Brown, 199 F.3d at 457).
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Court and a panel of the D.C. Circuit found a lack of adequate factual
support for these assertions, and the claim was deemed to be non-viable
because Chambers could not demonstrate “objectively tangible harm.”
Accepting this conclusion for present purposes,21 the key issue on appeal
is a purely legal one: whether an employer can essentially “mess with” a
worker and thwart her hopes and expectations for the job by transferring
her or denying a transfer, even for blatantly discriminatory reasons, when
she cannot prove that objectively tangible harm would ensue from the
employer’s actions. In more explicitly legal terms, the question for
purposes of en banc review is whether the full D.C. Circuit should retain
the rule in Brown: that forced transfers or denials of transfer requests are
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) only if there is “objectively
tangible harm.”
Before the full D.C. Circuit, Chambers argued that the requisite of
“objectively tangible harm” is at odds with Title VII’s text, Supreme Court
precedent, EEOC guidance, and Congress’ plan in passing Title VII.
Perhaps remarkably, the District changed its stance in en banc proceedings
and agreed with Chambers that the full court should overrule Brown and
conclude that discrimination in transfers is actionable even without
particularized concrete harm. Instead, it centered its argument on
We note the existence of a set of more favorable cases recognizing the real impacts of job
transfers and denials of transfer. See, e.g., Caraballo-Caraballo v. Corr. Admin., 892 F.3d 53,
61–62 (1st Cir. 2018) (transfer qualified as adverse action as it resulted in “significantly
different responsibilities” and duties); Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th
Cir. 2018) (denial of transfer that carried special responsibilities and additional prestige
and would have provided training and development opportunities); Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S.
Dep’t of HUD, 867 F.3d 70, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alleged denial of transfer “away from a
racially and ethnically biased supervisor to a non-biased supervisor more likely to advance
his career, falls within Title VII’s heartland”); Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1205 (10th
Cir. 2007) (facially-discriminatory policy against transfer between jails, when some
evidence indicated that a transfer would not be “purely lateral”—i.e., working at the second
facility would be less arduous and stressful and would increase employees’ chances of
obtaining additional job and leave flexibility) (emphasis added).
21
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backstopping against a potential broader ruling that § 2000-e(2)(a)(1)
covers any differential treatment in the workplace, even where the harm is
no more than de minimis. In light of this vital concession—which could
have potentially mooted Chambers’ appeal by giving her the liability
ruling she wanted—the D.C. Circuit appointed amicus curiae to defend the
proposition that the court should retain the “objectively tangible harm”
standard for Title VII claims under § 2000e-2(a)(1), including where
transfers are involved.22
The stakes of the appeal were vividly illustrated at oral argument. A
lawyer for the District raised the example of an employee who preferred
to be seated next to a fig tree rather than a fern, arguing that the situation
would be too trivial to give rise to a legal claim. In response, Judge Tatel
posited: “Suppose there was a memo in the file that said we’re not going
to assign the employee to the view of the fig tree because the employee is
Black.” After the lawyer for the District responded that such a situation
still would not be “actionable,” Judge Tatel was incredulous, remarking:
“This statute was passed in 1964 when there was blatant racial
discrimination in the workforce and you think the D.C. Circuit sitting en
banc should not say that the kind of blatant racial discrimination in the
hypothetical I just gave you was not in fact what Congress intended?”23
It remains to be seen not only which side will prevail but also how far the
full Circuit’s ruling will go and how widely it will sweep.

It is worth noting that multiple Circuit judges, including the current Justice Kavanaugh,
had been urging en banc review of this question since at least 2017. See, e.g., Ortiz-Diaz v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 831 F.3d 488, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, C.J.,
concurring); Ortiz-Diaz, 867 F.3d at 80–81 (Rogers and Kavanaugh concurrences). It seems
evident that the D.C. Circuit was somewhat eager to tackle the legal issue at stake and
needed to maintain the adversarial context.
22

Nadia Dreid, Full DC Circ. Digs Deep Into If Transfers Trigger Title VII Bias, LAW 360 (Oct.
26, 2021 11:17 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/employmentauthority/articles/1434938/full-dc-circ-digs-deep-into-if-transfers-trigger-title-vii-bias.
23
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In the end, whether focused specifically on transfers or framed more
broadly, the issue is whether “objectively tangible harm” (otherwise
referred to as “tangible job consequences” or a “significant change of
employment status”) is required under Title VII. Although some courts
have imposed similar thresholds to the Brown rule, we contend that
Chambers has the better view on several grounds. While the D.C. Circuit
may decide to cast away even a de minimis bar for claims, we maintain that
it need not be distracted by truly trivial scenarios and minutiae (see n.13,
supra).
Discriminatory Transfers and Transfer Denials Should Be Actionable
Under Title VII Even Without Specific Proof of Objectively “Tangible”
Harm
A. Statutory Text/Plain Language: Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2
A restrictive view of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of its terms. Requiring “tangible job
consequences” or a “significant change of employment status” cabins the
phase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to entail
something less than its natural language—and not to encompass the basic
conditions and circumstances under which one works. As the Supreme
Court has indicated, in order to effectuate Title VII’s broad purposes, this
statutory phrase is to be interpreted expansively, in its ordinary sense, not
“in the narrow contractual sense.”24 In the employment context, one’s
geographic location, work setting and environment, unit or department,
supervisor, hours, and shift/schedule are key components that define the
working experience. Forcing employees to suffer through even

See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; see also CM-613 Terms, Conditions, And Privileges of
Employment, issued 1982, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/cm-613-terms-conditions-and-privilegesemployment.
24
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subjectively unfavorable workplace conditions, penalizing them, or
denying benefits or privileges for discriminatory reasons impacts their
work lives and restricts equality of opportunity.25
As the concurrence in Chambers observed, Title VII’s text makes clear that
“any action by an employer to deny an employment benefit [including a
desired transfer] on [prohibited] grounds is an adverse employment
action under Title VII.”26 Indeed, an employee who seeks a transfer
requests a different job position, and “it is difficult to imagine a more
fundamental ‘term[ ]’ or ‘condition[ ]’ of employment than the position
itself.”27 Hence, “transferring an employee because of the employee’s [sex]
(or denying an employee’s requested transfer because of the employee's
[sex]) plainly constitutes discrimination with respect to ‘compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ in violation of Title VII.”28
However, based on a value judgment that some courts have made, many
cases have held that some forms of discrimination in the “terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment” are not serious or severe
enough to warrant intervention.29 For example, the Seventh Circuit has
suggested that a “purely lateral” transfer—one that “does not involve a
demotion in form or substance”—can never be a “materially adverse

We do not suggest that employees are legally entitled to a general veto power or the
prerogative to choose their own bosses or workspace. Rather, we advocate the
commonsense notion that an employer must act in a non-discriminatory fashion when
allocating benefits and resources among its workforce. For example, if an employer gives
all of the white employees brand new desks or equipment and all of the black employees
shoddy, old ones, it sends a clear discriminatory and exclusionary message inconsistent
with Title VII’s mandate of equal job treatment—even if the black employees are still
generally able to perform their work.
25

26

988 F.3d at 503 (citation omitted).

27

Id. at 504.

28

Id.

29

See supra nn. 7-10.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

employment action” covered by § 2000e-2(a)(1).30 Yet, courts must follow
the statute enacted by Congress and apply its plain language—even if
they do not like the result.31
How then, does this reading interact with Title VII case law on hostile
work environment, including the “severe or pervasive” test? Under the
case law, purely verbal conduct is not enough to change the work
environment and thus alter the “terms or conditions of employment”
unless it meets objective and subjective barometers; isolated, relatively
innocuous comments will not do, lest every ordinary interaction give rise
to a claim.32
But transfers and similar job actions directly implicate the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment even if there is no loss of rank,
pay, or other “tangible” markers; transfers in particular involve an
outright change in the employee’s job position and work environment. As
the dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc in Autozone noted, an
employment practice of assigning (and transferring) employees to stores
AutoZone, 860 F.3d at 569. Indeed, the AutoZone court held that the same result is
mandated under § 2000e-2(a)(2), even if the employee proves intentional, systematic job
segregation by race. The court viewed (a)(2) as broader and casting a “wider net” than
(a)(1); still, (a)(1) does not include comparable language that a job action “would deprive
or tend to deprive an[] individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee.” Following oral argument, court-appointed amici
submitted AutoZone as supplemental authority after it was referenced during the
argument.
30

See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express
terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s
no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
31

We contend that this framework has often been misapplied to deny relief in even
egregious circumstances. See, e.g., Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017)
(supervisor’s use of the n-word). In our view, either the prevailing rubric should be
liberalized (courts applying the New York City Human Rights Law strike the proper
balance, see n.13) or—at minimum—courts should be provided greater, more
particularized guidance as to the reach of the statute and the range of proscribed conduct.
32
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in different neighborhoods based on race clearly has the “adverse effect”
of depriving employees of “employment opportunities at their preferred
geographic location.”33
Consider the following hypothetical: If an employee seeks a transfer away
from a boss who is hostile and abusive to her but whose conduct is
ultimately determined not to be based on a protected characteristic or to
rise to the “severe or pervasive” level, may the employer refuse the
transfer for unlawful discriminatory reasons? We would suggest that the
answer is No, because the transfer must be considered independently.34
While some courts have drawn directly or indirectly from the
Faragher/Ellerth duo of cases in holding that “tangible” harm is required,35
the Court there considered the standards for holding employers liable for
the acts of supervisors, not the meaning of the phrase “terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.” The cases are applications of the concept of
“agency.”
The Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton36 observed that an employer is
automatically vicariously liable for discriminatory “tangible” employment

U.S. EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 875 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, the dissent rightly
observed, it has long been established that “deliberate racial segregation by its very nature
has an adverse effect on the people subjected to it.” Id. at 861.
33

Notably, in the retaliation context, it is established that an employee has a claim if she is
retaliated against for opposing allegedly discriminatory conduct that turns out not to
actually constitute illegal discrimination. E.g., Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786
F.3d 264, 282 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In the context of element one of a retaliation, an employee is
protected when she opposes not only employment actions actually unlawful under Title
VII but also employment actions she reasonably believes to be unlawful.”)
34

Including the D.C. Circuit in Brown, 199 F.3d at 456–57, deemed controlling by the panel
in Chambers.
35

36

524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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actions—such as “discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.”37
There is no indication that a transfer, which is a tangible action with
tangible results, is not covered by Title VII if there is not a proven tangible
harm.
Similarly, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,38 the Court held that an
employer is strictly liable for “tangible” employment actions, generally
characterized as “a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”39 In
such instance, the action is uniquely within the province of a supervisor,
bringing the power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. It is likely to
be recorded in the employer’s personnel files and could not have been
inflicted in absence of the agency relationship.40 These rationales appear to
hold in the case of a transfer (or denial of a transfer) to an entirely
different department; it is something that cannot be effectuated by a coworker but only by a supervisor or manager backed by the power of the
enterprise, and would very likely be recorded by the employer. Here,
Chambers alleges that the District, her employer, rather than any
particular individual, was responsible for denying her repeated transfer
requests.
And, even assuming that a “purely” lateral transfer is not “tangible”
within the meaning of Faragher/Ellerth, this does not mean that it falls
outside of the scope of Title VII. These cases suggest that conduct
perpetrated by an individual supervisor which does not come within the
category of “tangible” actions—there, sexual harassment—gives rise to a
Id. at 808 (emphasis added); see also id. at 790, 805 (examples of “tangible” actions
centering on hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, compensation, and “work
assignment”).
37

38

524 U.S. 742 (1998)

39

Id. at 761.

40

Id. at 761–62.
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potential affirmative defense to vicarious liability, centered on the
employer’s actual or constructive knowledge and exercise of reasonable
care.41 Vicarious liability is not at issue on the Chambers appeal.
In sum, the plain language of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision
supports a claim for the repeated denial of a lateral transfer for
discriminatory reasons. Excluding these types of decisions from the
purview of Title VII fails to adhere to the text of the statute and creates an
unwarranted heightened hurdle for plaintiffs to clear when bringing their
claims to court.42
See also Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 64–65 (“Ellerth [provides examples of “tangible” actions]
only to “identify a class of [hostile work environment] cases” in which an employer should
be held vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the acts of supervisors.
Ellerth did not discuss the scope of the general antidiscrimination provision.”) (citations
omitted).
41

Further, while (in accordance with the rehearing en banc order and the arguments before
the court), we have focused on the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,” allocating transfers and job opportunities on the basis of a protected
category (e.g., granting transfer requests to men but not women) may also implicate the
separate prohibition on limiting or segregating employees “in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee.” § 2000e-2(a)(2). This language too is expansive, and
indicative of an intent to proscribe a panoply of discriminatory conduct. For example, it
encompasses disparate impact claims (see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1
(1971)) and the failure to consider employment testers for a job position (Kyles v. J.K.
Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, even if Chambers cannot
show an immediate loss of opportunity, she alleges that denial of the transfer would tend
to deprive her of opportunities or otherwise affect her status: she is in one job position and
wants to be in a preferable one. We thus concur with the dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc in AutoZone.
42

Likewise, we suggest, a substantial argument exists that Chambers raises a jury issue
under Burlington’s deterrence-based standard for retaliation claims: “whether a particular
reassignment is materially adverse [such that it may well have dissuaded a worker from
engaging in protected activity] depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering all the circumstances.” 548 U.S. at 71. Burlington abrogates Brown’s “adverse
employment action” test, Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 695–96 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and thus
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B. Title VII’s Related Provisions and Remedies
These conclusions are bolstered by Title VII’s overall remedial regime and
statutory purpose. As set forth above, Title VII is intended to eradicate all
forms and vestiges of employment discrimination and ensure complete
equality of opportunity. Consequently, the statute does not bar claims
where the employee cannot establish a requisite level of damages or harm
but instead may entitle a victim of unlawful discrimination to recover
declaratory and injunctive relief designed to address the violation and
prevent similar occurrences—along with nominal damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.
First, nominal damages are a firmly entrenched concept in civil rights
cases involving violations of constitutional or statutory rights. They
recognize that the violation itself is a cognizable, remediable harm even in
the absence of actual damages.43 Nominal damages are a well-established
part of Title VII jurisprudence.44 And, nominal damages may be a
calls “into question” cases applying that standard to retaliation claims. Lin v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Lab., 2017 WL 435811, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2017); see also, e.g., Thompson v. N.
Am. Stainless LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011) (“Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must be
construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct” extending beyond § 2000e-2);
Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1166–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Burlington standard
applies to retaliation in the forms of increased workload and broadcasting plaintiff’s EEOC
charge internally). Burlington’s trivial-versus-material dichotomy must be applied with
due regard to “context” and the role of the jury. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68–69.
Nevertheless, in light of this test and its emphasis on severity, it makes sense for the en
banc court in Chambers to bypass this claim and focus on a pure question of law and
statutory interpretation under § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See, e.g., Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. 792 (holding that a demand for nominal damages for a
completed legal violation is alone sufficient to meet the redressability requirement for
Article III standing, even if plaintiff cannot quantify the harm in economic terms).
43

See, e.g., Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2001) (where
defendant-employer argued that nominal damages were not available under Title VII,
collecting cases to the contrary and concluding that it “has wasted this court’s time with a
specious argument”); Bailey v. Runyon, 220 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2000) (“nominal
44
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predicate to an award of attorney’s fees and costs.45
Second, even without actual (or even nominal) damages, a victim of
discrimination may recover punitive damages—designed to punish the
employer and deter future violations.46
Third, Title VII contains expansive and robust provisions for declaratory
and injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). It has long been
established that a district court has extensive authority and discretion to
fashion the remedies appropriate to the circumstances present in any
given case.47 There is no reason why a court could not craft an order
tailored to address the repeated denial of lateral transfers for
discriminatory reasons, even if the remedy might not involve
compensation for “objectively tangible harm.”

damages” are appropriately awarded where a Title VII [harassment] violation is proved
even though no actual damages are shown.”).
Prior to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, some courts held that nominal damages were
not available because the statute only provided for equitable, not legal, relief. See Bayer v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 870–71 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing circuit split on
whether nominal damages were equitable relief available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). That
is no longer the case.
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); Wiercinski v. Mangia 97, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 116 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is still a prevailing party and
may be entitled to fees and costs in Title VII cases.”).
45

Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 357–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (“An award of
actual or nominal damages is not a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages in Title
VII cases.”); Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 165 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder Title
VII, we do not require a ceremonial anchor of nominal damages to tie to a punitive
damages award.”); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 177 n.8 (D.D.C.
2010). See further Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010–11 (7th Cir.
1998); Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2005).
46

E.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 763–64, 770–71, 779–80; Albermarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418 (courts
have “not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future”); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1279, 1288–91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47
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Significantly, many of Title VII’s equitable remedies apply even in mixed
motive cases where an employee shows that the employer was partly
motivated by an unlawful discriminatory reason but the employer proves
that it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor.” § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). In such an instance,
the employee has suffered discrimination but no actual harm. Thus, the
statute provides for those injunctive and declaratory measures designed
to address the employer’s conduct and practices—as opposed to those
meant to make the employee whole—along with attorney’s fees and costs
needed to encourage pursuit of the claim.48 It appears especially
incongruous, then, to conclude that a claim is barred at the courthouse
door and that the act offers no remedy at all when unlawful
discrimination is the sole but-for cause of an employment action but the
injury is less than concrete.
--In essence, an employee who has suffered a Title VII violation is entitled
to bring an action to hold the employer accountable and to redress and
deter violations—and to avail herself of the statutory fee-shifting
provisions that empower and enable her to pursue a claim. It seems
incompatible with this regime to hold that some claims, particular those
involving transfers, are categorically barred because the injury and
corresponding harm is too intangible or elusive.

Conclusion: Implications of the Pending En Banc Decision in Chambers
Will Title VII be freed to be all that it can (and is supposed to) be or will its
wings continue to be clipped by a wary judiciary? This is the fundamental
question posed in Chambers. Courts’ interpretations and applications of
the act to preclude claims based on lateral transfers, certain forms of
discipline, and the like are driven not by the plain language and purposes
48

See id.
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of the statute but by a desire to cabin the statute and limit the number of
claims. Even if such doctrines and decisions are well-meaning, they
impede the paramount objective to root out employment discrimination
wherever it appears. Under Title VII, difficulty in converting the harm
suffered into concrete terms should be a damages issue and not a
complete bar to a claim. If the influential D.C. Circuit follows the text of
Title VII, as some judges have indicated they are inclined to do, it may
turn the tide and usher in a new era of greater enforcement of the
statutory mandate against discrimination in the workplace.
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